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ABSTRACT
Algorithms for identifying the infection states of nodes in a
network are crucial for understanding and containing infec-
tions. Often, however, only a relatively small set of nodes
have a known infection state. Moreover, the length of time
that each node has been infected is also unknown. This miss-
ing data – infection state of most nodes and infection time
of the unobserved infected nodes – poses a challenge to the
study of real-world cascades.
In this work, we develop techniques to identify the latent
infected nodes in the presence of missing infection time-and-
state data. Based on the likely epidemic paths predicted by
the simple susceptible-infected epidemic model, we propose
a measure (Infection Betweenness) for uncovering these un-
known infection states. Our experimental results using ma-
chine learning algorithms show that Infection Betweenness
is the most effective feature for identifying latent infected
nodes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Networks are underlying mediums for the spread of
epidemics such as diseases, rumors, and computer viruses.
Determining the infection state of nodes is the first step
to taking corrective or preventive action to stop or slow
the spread of an epidemic. Unfortunately, the infec-
tion state of nodes is often unknown; for example: in
the spread of computer malware (say, a contaminated
email attachment) over a large organization, IT special-
ist will likely only inspect the computers of users that
open trouble tickets; a similar problem occurs with the
spread of rumors over online social networks. Hence,
the problem of effectively identifying the infection state
of unobserved nodes given a set of observed nodes is of
central importance in the study of infection cascades.
In this work we consider a network where an epidemic
starts from a single source. Each node appears in one
of two states:(i) susceptible, capable of being infected,
(ii) infected, able to spread the epidemic further. We
also assume that the infection state of a subset of nodes
is known and the full network structure (adjacency ma-
trix) is available. Our research question is: Given a
set of nodes with known infection state and the network
topology can we correctly uncover the unknown infection
state of the remaining nodes?
The contributions of this work are the following:
• We introduce a measure for estimating the state of
unobserved nodes, denoted Infection Betweenness.
Our simulation results using simple infection mod-
els show that our measure-based method classified
nodes with an accuracy of up to 90% while it finds
up to 80% of infected nodes in a network.
• We investigate the impact of network characteris-
tics, such as the degree distribution and clustering
coefficient, on the estimation performance of our
approach. Our observations indicate that machine
learning algorithms using our measure gets more
accurate as the degree distribution becomes less
positively-skewed and has a smaller standard de-
viation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 depicts the problem statement. Section 3 in-
troduces Infection Betweenness. Section 4 represents
the experimental result about the performance of In-
fection Betweenness with machine learning algorithms.
Section 5 reviews the related literature. Finally, Section
6 presents our conclusions and future work.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Let G(V,E) be an undirected graph where V is a set
of nodes and E ⊆ V 2 is a set of edges. Suppose that an
epidemic starts at a single node (denoted “source”) and
propagates to neighbors in G(V,E). Let Xi ∈ {0, 1}
denotes to the state of node i ∈ V where Xi = 0 means
node i is susceptible and Xi = 1 that it is infected.
Assume that an infected node contaminates neighbors
at rate λ. Then,
Xi : 0→ 1 at rate λ
∑
j∈n(i)
Xj ,
where n(i) is the set of neighborhood of i.
Assume that there are l nodes with observed infection
state L = {(1, X1), ..., (l, Xl))}. There are also u =
|V | − l nodes with unknown infection state, U = {xl+1
1
Table 1: Topologies
Topology Type n m c σ s d 2 Description
Yeast Biological 1870 2277 0.0672 3.1374 6.5044 19 Yeast Protein Interaction Network [4]
GrQc Collaboration 5242 28980 0.5296 7.9179 3.8317 17
Collaboration networks from ArXiv General Relativity
and Quantum Cosmology [6]
HepTh Collaboration 9877 51971 0.4714 6.1864 3.0213 18
Collaboration networks from ArXiv High Energy
Physics [6]
Power Device 4941 6594 0.0801 1.7913 2.1898 46
Topology of the Western States Power Grid of the
United States [11]
Oregon Device 11174 23409 0.2964 33.0948 46.4017 10
Topology of Autonomous Systems (AS) peering in-
formation inferred from Oregon route-views between
March 31 2001 and May 26 2001 [5]
1
n, m, c, σ, s, and d are the number of nodes, the number of edges, clustering coefficient, standard deviation of degree distribution,
skewness of degree distribution [12], and diameter of network, respectively
2 d is calculated with the largest connected component if a network has multiple connected components
..., xl+u}; l is typically much smaller than u. Given the
set of observed nodes L and the adjacency matrix A of
the network, our goal is to correctly assign an infection
state Xi to node i = l+ 1, . . . , l+ u.
3. MEASURING INFECTION STATE
In this section, we describe the propagation proper-
ties of the SI epidemic that allows us to determine the
unknown infection state of nodes. Then in Section 3.2
we introduce Infection Betweenness using the lessons
learned in Section 3.1.
3.1 Propagation Properties
Under the assumption that an epidemic propagates
from a single source to neighboring nodes following the
SI model, we identify the following properties. Let So
denote the set of observed susceptible nodes and Io be
the set of observed infected nodes.
• Property 1: If removing all nodes in So from the
network disconnects the network, then one of the
disconnected components contains all of the in-
fected nodes
• Property 2: Let S ∈ V be a cut set that divides Io
into multiple components, then at least one node
in S is infected
Figure 1: Red nodes and white nodes repre-
sent infected and susceptible nodes, respectively.
Dotted circles (nodes 2, 3, 6, and 7) show nodes
with unknown infection state and full circles
(nodes 1, 4, and 5) show nodes with known in-
fection state. From Property 1 we know that
6 and 7 are not infected. From Property 2 we
know that either 2 or 3 must be infected.
Consider the topology shown in Figure 1. Removal
of node 5, which is observed and susceptible divides
the graph into two components, {1, 2, 3, 4} and {6}.
Only the component {1, 2, 3, 4} contains infected nodes
(Property 1). Since there is no propagation path from
infected nodes without node 5, we can determine that
nodes 6 and 7 are susceptible (deterministic suscepti-
ble nodes). Observed infected nodes {1, 4} divide into
two components by removing nodes 2 and 3, which are
not observed. Because the removal of nodes 2 and 3
places infected nodes 1 and 4 in distinct component,
node 2 and/or 3 must be infected (Property 2). Using
Property 1, we can reduce the number of nodes with
unknown state by ignoring nodes in components that
can be isolated by healthy nodes. In the rest of this pa-
per, we focus on the reduced graph in which observed
and deterministic susceptible nodes are excluded from
the original graph.
Even though Property 2 does not provide a direct way
for determining the unknown infection state, it points to
the importance of a particular node in possibly infect-
ing known infected nodes. Next, we use this insight to
define a new centrality metric, Infection Betweenness.
3.2 Infection Betweenness
Let G′ be a subgraph constructed by removing all
nodes that must be healthy according to Property 1.
The number of paths of length r ≥ 0 between a pair of
nodes (i, j) in G′, Nij , is
N
(r)
ij = (A
r)ij ,
where A is the adjacency matrix of G′.
Suppose that each path of length r is given a weight
α > 0; then
Nij =
∞∑
r=0
αN
(r)
ij =
∞∑
r=0
(αrAr)ij .
is the weighted sum of paths from i to j. We can write
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this expression in matrix notation
N =
∞∑
r=0
αrAr = (I− αA)−1.
Let Nu(i, j) denote the weighted sum of paths from
node i to j through node u. Given G′′ = G′ − {u},
we can calculate Nu(i, j) by subtracting the weighted
sum of paths from i to j in G′′ from the sum in G′;
however, constructing G′′ and performing the inverse
operation for N of each G′′ requires additional compu-
tation. Therefore, we resort to simple approximation
Nu(i, j) ≈ Niu×Nuj . Summing over all possible nodes
u ∈ V yields
Mij =
∑
u∈V
Nu(i, j) =
∑
u∈V
NiuNuj = (N
2)ij .
We define the Infection Betweenness of node u be-
tween two infected nodes i and j as:
Bu(i, j) =
Nu(i, j)
Mij
,
which is the fraction of the weighted sum of path from i
to j through u over the total weighted sum of paths from
i to j; thus, node u is more likely to be infected by node
i or j as Bu(i, j) increases. If Bu(i, j) is the probability
that an infected node contaminates a neighbor then 1−
Bu(i, j) is approximately the probability that node u
was not infected when the infection traveled between
nodes i and j. As a consequence, we approximate the
probability that a node u is infected as
P (Xu = 1|Io) ≈ 1−
∏
i,j∈Io, i6=j
(1−Bu(i, j)) , (1)
where Io is the set of observed infected nodes.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Setup
We use datasets from several real world networks,
which we classify into three categories: biological, col-
laboration, and device networks. In this paper, we use
five datasets referred as to Yeast (biological), Power,
Oregon (device), GrQc, and HepTh (collaboration).
Table 1 shows several characteristics of these networks,
e.g., numbers of nodes and clustering coefficients.
We run batches of simulations for each network topol-
ogy in Table 1 while varying the fraction of observed
nodes from 5% to 25%. In each run, we simulate a
Susceptible-Infected (SI) cascade [7] starting at a ran-
domly selected seed node with infection rate λ = 0.5
until 10% of nodes are infected. The parameter weight
α of IB is set to 0.01 to guarantee to be less than the
reciprocal of largest eigenvalue of adjacency matrix of
the reduced graph (the condition that α must satisfy for
the sum N in the equation of infection betweenness to
converge). If a network has multiple connected compo-
nents as doesYeast, we assume that an epidemic starts
at a node in the largest connected component. In order
to evaluate accuracy, we use three metrics: precision,
recall, and F-Measure [14].
• Precision: the fraction of correctly classified nodes
in nodes whose state is classified as infected
• Recall: the fraction of nodes whose state is classi-
fied as infected out of the all infected nodes
• F-measure: a measure to consider both precision
and recall in a single metric by taking their har-
monic mean (2×precision×recall
precision+recall ).
4.2 Incorporating Infection Betweenness into
Machine Learning Algorithms
In this section, we introduce a classification method
using the feature based on infection betweenness and
other node features based on machine learning (ML) al-
gorithms. We choose three ML algorithms described in
the following subsection. To apply these ML algorithms
to experiments, we use the WEKA machine learning
software suite [2]. For each topology, we collect the
features of unobserved nodes from 30 simulation runs
and then aggregate the collected feature instances into
a training set. We run another 70 simulation runs to
generate test data.
4.2.1 Node features
We consider six node characteristics that are avail-
able using information regarding network topology and
the observed nodes, as features for building ML-based
classifiers. The first five features are: degree normal-
ized by the maximum degree in the network D, ob-
served infected neighbor ratio R, betweenness centrality
C(b), closeness centrality C(c), and eigenvector central-
ity C(e). We also include P as a feature, defined as
the Infection Betweenness probability that a node is in-
fected shown in Eq. (1).
4.2.2 Classifiers
Naive-Bayes. Naive Bayes algorithms (NB, NBK)
work under the assumption that there is no correla-
tion between features given the class (infection state),
NB derives a conditional probability for the relation-
ships between the feature values and the class. To this
end, NB must estimate the distribution of feature val-
ues. For real-valued features, NB will assume that the
values of each feature follows a particular distribution
such as a Gaussian distribution. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of NB to classify the state of unobserved nodes
as well as Naive Bayes using and kernel density esti-
mation (NBK); Kernel density estimation models use
multiple (Gaussian) distributions, and generally provide
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more accurate results than using a single (Gaussian)
distribution.
C4.5 Decision Tree (C4.5) constructs a decision
tree model in which each internal node represents a test
on features, each branch an outcome of the test, and
each leaf node a class label [8]. In order to use a decision
tree for classification, a given tuple (a set of feature
values of a node), whose class we want to classify, walks
through the decision tree from the root to a leaf. The
label of final reached leaf is the classified class of which
the tuple belong.
4.2.3 Predictive Features
In order to examine which features provides meaning-
ful information for identifying latent infected nodes, we
investigate the performance of ML-based classifiers with
each feature. Figure 2 shows the average F-measure
of NB and C4.5 with each feature for all the net-
works. The best feature will have F-measure close to
one (darker squares). We observe that the feature based
on infection betweenness (P ) produces the darkest col-
umn showing to be the best predictive feature in both
NB and C4.5 algorithms over nearly all networks. In
the case of C4.5, R yields similar performance to P .
We also see that D and C(c) are also meaningful fea-
tures in several networks although not as good as P .
However, except for P , the effectiveness of other fea-
tures differs significantly depending on the network and
the ML algorithm.
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Figure 2: Predictive power of each feature.
4.3 ML-based Infection State Prediction
Above we found that the feature based on infection
betweenness (P ) to be the most predictive feature of a
node’s infection state. In what follows, we show the ac-
curacy of the ML-based classifiers over various scenarios
when we incorporate all features (including P ).
4.3.1 Combining All Features
In the following test we create cascades that infects
approximately 10% of the nodes in the network and
then reveal the infection state of 15% of the nodes (ran-
domly selected). Figure 3(a) shows the F-measure of
each of Section 4.2.2 classifiers using only P as feature.
Note the significant performance difference between the
classifiers for HepTh and Oregon; in these latter net-
works the F-measure of NBK is around 0.1, which is at
least one third of that of the other classifiers. We also
observe that both in HepTh and Oregon NBK using
only P is unable to correctly classifying most unknown
infection states. Next, we compare the ML-based clas-
sifiers using all of the features to those using only P in
order to check whether more features can improve the
performance of the classifiers by adding more features.
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Figure 3: Performance of ML algorithms
Figure 3(b) shows the F-measure of each classifier
using all six features (which includes P ) minus the F-
measure of the same classifiers using feature Palone. All
classifiers using all features see performance improve-
ments in Yeast compared to their single feature coun-
terparts. In other networks by adding the extra five
features the classifiers may, depending on the network,
slightly underperform their P feature counterparts, e.g.,
NB with only P outperformsNB with P and the extra
five features in GrQc, HepTh, and Oregon. We con-
jecture that by adding more features (thus increasing
the problem dimension) we make learning more diffi-
culty, resulting in the observed performance degrada-
tion. For C4.5 using all six features enhances perfor-
mance in Yeast and GrQc while there is no signifi-
cant change over other networks. We note then that for
C4.5 feature P is by far the most important feature as
adding extra five features in most cases does little to
increase the classification accuracy. Note that except
for Power, NBK with all features always yields bet-
ter performance than NBK with feature P alone: in
particular, using all features increases the F-measure of
NBK applied to in HepTh andOregon by around 0.4
and 0.2, respectively. Even in Power, the performance
degradation of NBK by using all features is not note-
worthy. It shows that we can improve the performance
of a particular classifier by combining the infection be-
tweenness feature P with the other node features. In
future work we will explore other classifiers such as clas-
sifiers based on random forests.
4.3.2 Prediction v.s. fraction of observed nodes
In this section, we study the impact of the fraction of
observed nodes on the accuracy of our classifiers with
all six features. Figure 4 compares the average preci-
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Figure 4: Accuracy for varying fraction of nodes with observed state (Bar: Precision, Dot: Recall)
sion and recall of each classifier according to the frac-
tion of observed nodes. Again, the epidemic infects
10% of nodes. Here, we also compare our classifiers
against random-guessing (Random), which tosses a bi-
ased coin and with probability 0.1 (0.1 is the fraction
of infected nodes) declares the node to be infected. As
shown in Figure 4, our classifiers outperform random-
guessing both in precision and recall. Also, the precision
and recall of our classifiers increases with the fraction
of observed nodes; as expected, increasing the fraction
of observed nodes provides more information about the
infection state of the unobserved nodes.
In a closer look C4.5 exhibits the best precision over
all classifiers on almost of all the networks: the only
exception is Power, where NBK yields slightly better
precision performance than C4.5. Comparing the pre-
cisions of each network, we observe that our classifiers
show the best precision in Power followed by GrQc,
HepTh, Yeast, and Oregon. The power network is
almost planar, likely making the classification task eas-
ier. In next section, we also explore which network char-
acteristic affects on the performance of our classifiers.
We now look at the recall of each classifier. Figure
4 shows that NBK yields the best recall performance
over all the networks except for Power. Note that the
precisions of NBK is lower than that of C4.5 except
for Power. It means that NBK are more likely to
find unknown infected nodes, but its classifications to
the infected state are not as accurate as C4.5. When
considering each network, all classifiers yield better re-
call performance in Power. Also, Oregon remains
the most difficult network to correctly classify the in-
fected nodes. Even though all classifiers yield relatively
high precisions (greater than 0.5) in Oregon, their re-
call performance in Oregon is less than 0.2, which
is similar to that of random-guessing. It means that
in Oregon our classifiers make correct decisions when
they classify unknown states to infected, but many in-
fected nodes are classified as healthy. In future work,
we will explore a method to improve the recall perfor-
mance of these classifiers using the estimated infected
probability.
4.3.3 Impact of Network Characteristics
We now investigate the impact of network charac-
teristics on the performance of our classifiers (using all
six features as before). To this end, we investigate the
average correlation coefficient between the F-measure
performance ranks and ranks of network characteristics
for each network; for instance, Oregon has the high-
est Degree Skewness and NBK is the worst performer
among the five classifiers: then we correlate 1 (highest
rank in degree skewness) and 5 (worst classifier of five
classifiers). Table 2 presents the average Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient [13] between the ranks of network
characteristics and F-measures.
Table 2: Correlation Coefficient between Ranks
according to F-measure and Network Character-
istics
Characteristic
Correlation
NB NBK & C4.5
Clustering Coefficient 0.1 0.2
Standard Deviation of Degree -0.7 -0.6
Degree Skewness -1.0 -0.9
As shown in Table 2, the performance of the classifiers
is strongly negatively correlated with degree skewness
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and the degree standard deviation. As the degree skew-
ness and the degree standard deviation decrease the
classifiers become more accurate. Interestingly, there
is a little correlation between clustering coefficient and
classification performance even though an epidemic is
more likely to propagate to nodes in a same cluster. A
validation with extensive experiment using more net-
works is part of our future work.
5. RELATED WORK
Several methods to detect the presence of network
worms and rumor spreading nodes have been proposed
in the literature. However, there has been little rigorous
work done on inferring the infection state from incom-
plete data obtained at a relatively few observed nodes
without the aid of infection timestamps.
Shah and Zaman [10] studied the problem of find-
ing the source of a computer virus in a network. They
focused on how to find the source among the set of in-
fected nodes that are observed, which is different from
our goal. Based on their metric called rumor central-
ity, they constructed a machine-learning estimator that
finds the source exactly or within a few hops in net-
works. They also analyzed the asymptotic behavior of
their virus source estimator for regular trees and geo-
metric trees.
Sadikov et al. [9] present an estimation method of
network properties, such as the number of weakly con-
nected components, given a sampled network. By for-
mulating a simple k-tree model and approximating it
to the original network, their method can estimate the
properties of original networks; they showed that their
method can accurately estimate properties of the origi-
nal network even when 90% of nodes are not sampled.
Zou et al. [15] developed an early detection system to
check the presence of a worm in the Internet. The
proposed detection approach monitors traffic data at
ingress/egree point of a local network. Even with the bi-
ased monitored data, it can accurately predict the over-
all vulnerable population size and estimate how many
hosts are really infected in the global Internet system.
Closely related to our work is that of Gomez et al. [1],
who develop an algorithm for inferring the network over
which a diffusion propagates. Given the observed times
when nodes become infected, they determine paths through
which the diffusion most likely took, i.e., a directed
graph where a contagion passed through. In contrast,
our work tries to identify the infection state of each un-
observed nodes given a limited number of nodes with
known infection state and no infection timestamps.
Jaikaeo et al. [3] presented a malicious node detec-
tion method based on comparisons between neighboring
nodes, performed on a central server. It is not applica-
ble without a central server which can directly access
and inspect each node; thus, their method depends on
being able to inspect each node individually.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied how to identify the infected
nodes without individually inspecting all nodes in the
network. Based on the well known SI model, we defined
the Infection Betweenness (IB) metric for identifying
the latent infection status of nodes. Our empirical re-
sults show that the machine learning classifiers with the
IB metric as feature along with other network-wide fea-
tures outperform random-guessing and the same classi-
fiers without the IB metric as a feature. We also ana-
lyzed the impact of the amount of missing data as well
as the impact of network characteristics on the effec-
tiveness of the algorithms.
Future work consists of performing more extensive ex-
periments with larger networks, as well as a theoretical
analysis about the relationship between network char-
acteristics and performance of the algorithms.
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